Abstract: I show that in cases of risk, agent-centered prerogatives generate apparent conflicts between two compelling principles: Objective-Subjective Link (if you know that an option is objectively permissible, then it’s subjectively permissible), and a version of Ex Ante Pareto (if an option gives everyone affected a worse prospect than an available alternative, and all else is equal, then it’s subjectively impermissible). Some might think that these conflicts provide a new argument against prerogatives. Others might think that these conflicts support rejecting one of these principles. I argue, instead, that these conflicts are merely apparent: one’s prerogatives depend in a particular way on one’s uncertainty such that they’re compatible with both principles. The upshot is a better understanding both of principles like Objective-Subjective Link and Ex Ante Pareto, and of how prerogatives apply under risk.

Abstract: Moral options are permissions to do less than best, impartially speaking. In this paper, we investigate the challenge of reconciling moral options with the ideal of justifiability to each individual. We examine ex-post and ex-ante views of moral options and show how they might conflict with this ideal in single-choice and sequential-choice cases, respectively. We consider some ways of avoiding this conflict in sequential-choice cases, showing that they face significant problems.

Under review.